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Introduction
Intended as a sequel to “Kiyozawa Manshi and the Meaning of Buddhist 
Ethics,” I have prepared this translation of one of Kiyozawa Manshi’s essays 
on the subject of the relationship of religion to ethics and morality. Written in 
1903, the last year of his short life, it is widely regarded as his most mature 
statement on how he viewed the ethical imperative of religion. The reader 
should bear in mind the political climate in Japan at this time when the Bud­
dhist community was struggling to regain its social legitimacy after decades of 
attenuation at the hands of the Meiji political oligarchy. The turn of the cen­
tury saw the first incursions of Japanese militarism abroad and the political 
climate imposed a social mission on religious organizations, both Buddhist 
and Christian, in which their spiritual goals were expected to demonstratively 
serve the modernization efforts of the nation-state. Titled “The Relationship 
between Religious Morality and Common Morality,’ Kiyozawa here, as 
elsewhere, does not appear to be concerned with distinguishing morality from 
ethics; indeed both words appear to be used interchangeably in this text. In the 
title, the term, “Religious Morality” is followed by the phrase zokutai in 
brackets. Zokutai is a technical Buddhist term representing the concept 
known in Sanskrit as samvrti-satya: religious truth that can be known by or­
dinary beings such as you and me; it is commonly translated as “worldly 
truth”. Coupled with it, Mahayana texts also discuss the “highest” or “ab­
solute” truth, shintai Xsflf, which derives from the Sanskritparamartha-satya. 
It is unlikely that even a figure such as Kiyozawa Manshi was aware of the San­
skrit equivalents of these traditional Chinese Buddhist terms at the time this 
essay was published, however, for the study of Sanskrit Buddhist texts in
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Japan was still in its infancy. I have therefore tried to consider these crucial 
terms within the semantic context of the Sino-Japanese terminology of the en­
tire essay, rather than translate them back into Sanskrit.
Translation
Although it is often said that morality is the most important issue in 
the world of man, we do not respect this [judgement]. In fact, it is not 
uncommon for people to wonder what sort of factors are at play that 
have induced a trend in which we now have people who appear deter­
mined to eradicate morality entirely. Some look at the Buddhist doc­
trine of the two truths, absolute and worldly, as found in Shinshfl1 and 
say the worldly truth is none other than the teachings of ethics and 
morality. There are others, however, who would criticize this position, 
saying that not only does this reflect the error of partiality in ad­
vocating only the absolute truth, but it also leads to the loss of the 
benefits Shinshu affords to the nation and society. In the following 
pages I would like to present my feelings about the issue of morality 
and the Buddhist concept of worldly truth.
In general, the teaching of the two truths is extremely deep and sub­
tle, but it also reflects a common, everyday attitude. One result of this 
is the existence of people who have somehow only heard about the 
popular side of the issue and thus understand little of its profound im­
plications. Although it is difficult to treat exhaustively the details of 
this matter in this space, I will attempt to outline it briefly. Buddhism 
may be said to begin from considerations of an ethical life and pro­
ceeds to doctrines classified as HinayAna, MahaySna, Exoteric, or 
Esoteric. Furthermore, for those who are spiritually unable to enter 
into any of these systems, there is a way of salvation that, in the 
end, saves all sentient beings without exception by means of a single 
Dharma teaching: namely, the teaching of the two truths, worldly and 
absolute, which exhausts the full extent of the Buddha’s great compas-
’ This is a reference to the particular doctrines of the J Odo Shinshfl Buddhist sect in 
Japan. For more of Kiyozawa Manshi's personal opinions on traditional ShinshQ doc­
trine, see the translator's article, “Kiyozawa Manshi and the Meaning of Buddhist 
Ethics" in The Eastern Buddhist, Spring 1988.
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sion. For this reason, the teaching of the two truths naturally tran­
scends the so-called ethics and morality of this world. And [relevant 
to our present discussion,] the sublime message inherent in the gate of 
worldly truth is truly astonishing.
Anything which could be termed a religious doctrine or ethical 
teaching is based on thoughts of good and bad that exist in our minds. 
All teachings endeavor to encourage the good and control the bad; by 
doing so the goal is to bring us to the attainment of peace of mind. 
Spoken of from another point of view, we attempt to release ourselves 
from dissatisfaction and achieve contentment. But within this suffering 
and joy,2 it is the suffering and joy as it relates to the issue of good and 
bad that is indeed the predominant concern. The doctrines or teachings 
we see in the world are attempts therefore to enable the individual to 
reach a pre-determined space where he can rest assured he has found a 
solution to this problem.
Now with regard to the issue of precisely what is good and what is 
bad, [we can say that] although all ordinary people feel this is perfectly 
obvious, looking at the research of scholars we find that things are in 
fact not at all clear. What is considered good in country A may be con­
sidered bad in country B, and the reverse may also be true. Moreover, 
what was [considered] good during a former age may be seen as bad 
in a later time [within the same country]. The converse also occurs. 
This being the situation, there are inevitable doubts about what is truly 
good and what is truly bad. When people speak of a relevant, practical 
morality or religion, however, they have little interest in debating such 
doubts. When practical morality or religion is the basis of one’s con­
cern, prevailing conceptions in other countries or in previous times 
are simply not considered. The crucial point is now, directly before 
us—deciding what action we should take. At such moments nothing 
else matters. [For most people,] their approach is simple: in their 
heart of hearts what they feel is good is good, what they feel is bad is 
bad. Were it possible to always do what one thinks is good and never 
do what one thinks is bad, all systems of morality and religion would 
affirm this position.
2 What I have translated as suffering and joy are standard Buddhist terms for the 
two poles of how we process sensation: we are repulsed by what we perceive as leading 
to suffering or anxiety (S. duhkha) and attracted to what we think will bring us joy or 
happiness (S. sukha).
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Nevertheless, if we address ourselves to the question of why morality 
and religion are so difficult [to practice], we must first recognize the 
fact that when each individual by himself tries to honestly base his ac­
tions on what he feels is good and bad, things just do not happen as he 
thought they would. The harder he strives the more he realizes how 
problematic his situation is. And as his understanding of the difficulty 
progresses, the more it occupies his thoughts. From this corresponding 
growth in concern comes a variety of arguments on the subject of good 
and evil. The present situation in Japan is exactly at this stage. From 
the desire to advance the practice of morality, we have today a blossom­
ing of academic discussions on the subject of ethics and indeed the 
[various] positions are interesting. Some say that if one’s motivation 
is good, then as a result one’s behavior must accordingly be good. 
Another position states that regardless of one’s motivation, if an in­
dividual’s actions are evil, then this is [unambiguously] evil. For the 
purposes of research, these [opinions] are all attractive. But in the end, 
this is only debate or research. When we come to the practice of morali­
ty, debate or research makes little difference. Individually, everyone 
feels they should simply do exactly what they think is right and not do 
what they think is wrong. But even if one were certain about what con­
stitutes good and bad behavior in a particular situation, in fact it is 
difficult to carry out exactly what you think is good and completely 
refrain from what you think is bad. This kind of “difficulty” is com­
pletely different from the “difficulty” that arises in debate or research 
[on morality or ethics].
If the situation were such that we could not get to the level of prac­
tice until these troublesome investigations into the nature of ethics were 
resolved, then we would have to say that today we are not yet at a time 
when [ethical] praxis can take place. The actual practice of morality, 
however, is not at all dependent on this. It has been going on since an­
cient times [while the debate over what is good and evil continues to the 
present day]. And there is nothing to prevent one from beginning its 
[practice] today as well. If we do not begin [our ethical behavior] to­
day, moreover, when could we hope to? [If we waited for the resolu­
tion of this academic debate] that time would never come. Hence the 
practice of morality is not something to be seen as linked to moral 
debate or research. They are totally separate.
On the other hand, for those who focus directly on praxis and en-
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counter the problems inherent thereof, movement into the arena of 
debate and research on morality is natural. But one thereupon 
discovers all the problems that lie here as well and it becomes clear that 
this latter path will not provide any easy solutions [either]. One 
thereupon feels a tremendous stimulus toward [greater diligence in] 
practice and, with an even deeper zeal than before, one may return to 
the path of single-minded cultivation of practice. It is interesting that 
within this process many people either well-grounded in scholarship or 
with strong intellectual leanings will spend a long period of time, even 
decades, in intellectual debate. Among those with no academic achieve­
ment and weak intellectual inclinations, however, there are many who 
easily succeed in breaking away from this labyrinth of argument and in­
vestigation. There are also many who, from the outset, have never 
engaged in debate or research. In any case, everyone finds their con­
cerns will ultimately be focused only on praxis, and no one can avoid 
experiencing problems in this area. Those people who, having heard 
the teaching of the two truths according to tariki Shinshu, feel they are 
easily capable of putting into practice the worldly truth teaching, have 
simply not yet reached this point. They are of a like mind to those 
researching and debating the meaning of morality.
There is one point to be made concerning this dilemma wherein it is 
not easy to do what is right (i.e. good) and abstain from what is wrong 
(i.e. evil). These [notions of good and evil] are basic ideas expressed in 
all teachings; but if we look into this one step further, we can say that, 
in fact, rather than calling these “teachings”, they should be seen as 
natural inclinations. Before we are ever taught such things, we are 
naturally endowed with desires motivating us to behave well rather 
than badly. Therefore, if it were truly possible to act on [these inclina­
tions] without difficulty, then even if we were not formally concerned 
with this issue, we should be able to do what is morally correct. But 
things do not really work in this way and, in fact, even when [ethics] 
are taught with extreme care, still no one can fully behave [in a morally 
proper way]. To the practice of morality applies the saying: a three- 
year old child can speak of it but even an eighty-year old man cannot 
do it. Accordingly, if there are those who think the practice of ShinshO 
worldly truth is easily accomplished, we must call this a misapprehen­
sion of the situation.
Some people will say the worldly truth according to ShinshO is
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different in its intent than that of ordinary ethics or morality. They will 
say that since the usual sense of ethics or morality is separated from 
religion, it cannot be practiced. But because Shinshfi worldly truth is 
a morality which flows from absolute truth, so long as the attainment 
of shinjin* is definite, moral practice will be natural and inevitable. 
Though it seems there is an element of truth in this, there is also one 
aspect which requires some care. We are referring to the distinction be­
tween things that occur naturally and inevitably and things which are 
carried out intentionally and deliberately. Something which occurs 
naturally and inevitably need not be taught. The necessity of “teach­
ings” lies in the attempt to enlighten our intentions and deliberations 
by means of those teachings. Therefore, if the practice of worldly truth 
in Shinsha terms were accomplished naturally and inevitably, so long 
as the ultimate truth exists, there should be no need for worldly truth 
teachings. From the fact that the worldly truth is taught nearly shoul­
der to shoulder with the absolute truth, it should be clear that the 
practice of worldly truth is in fact not something which manifests 
naturally and inevitably from the shinjin of absolute truth. [Rather] 
what is gained naturally and inevitably from the shinjin of absolute 
truth is the so-called “ten kinds of worldly benefits.”3 4 Because it is 
grasped in this way, there is no teaching stemming from it which says 
on any particular issue: “do this and do not do that,’ or “one must do 
this and must not do that”. There is no hint of any teaching [in this 
tradition] which advocates praying to the gods for protection or for 
blessings of the highest regard. This is because even without such 
prayer, one naturally and inevitably has already obtained the benefits 
of protection from the gods and blessings of the highest merit. Among 
the ten benefits [attained when shinjin is realized], one is transforming 
evil into good and another is realizing gratitude and thus repaying
3 Shinjin may be translated as the “enlightenment of faith.** This religious ex­
perience is the quintessential religious event in the life of a ShinshQ believer. Here 
Kiyozawa appears to be referring to an assumption that those who have attained this 
awakening are de facto capable of proper moral discernment and successful praxis in 
moral terms, or as he puts it, “perfect praxis.**
4 Genshojisshu noyaku This is a reference to the ten kinds of benefits
said to accrue to the nembutsu practitioner during this lifetime as mentioned by 
Shinran at the end of the chapter on Faith in his KydgyOshinshO. For a full discussion 
on this topic, see the BukkyO Daiji-i II: 1099-1101.
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merit [to the Buddha]. In these particular doctrines we have evidence 
of concern for good and evil as well as esteeming a sense of obligation. 
But these are benefits that accrue naturally and inevitably; there is no 
[accompanying] teaching which says, “For this reason, do this and do 
that”.
[As stated above,] since the Shinshu worldly truth is expounded as a 
teaching equally majestic with the absolute truth, it should be under­
stood that it does not express something which naturally and inevitably 
manifests from the experience of shinjin; rather it exists in order to 
enlighten our intentional activity. Seen in this way, there is no problem 
in affirming that the difficulties in implementing the worldly truth of 
Shinshu are not particularly different from the difficulties in implement­
ing common morality or ethics; in the final analysis, the perfect practice 
of Shinshu worldly truth is [also] something not easily accomplished.
Although the perfect praxis of either the worldly truth of Shinshfl or 
common ethics and morality may be difficult, some degree of suc­
cessful practice is possible. If one gradually cultivates oneself, in fact, 
one can increasingly draw closer to perfection [in praxis]. The 
teachings [of any moral system], though they may be vexing, are 
therefore most important in this respect. It is a frequently presented 
argument, moreover, that [moral] practice is an urgent imperative. 
This position also has some truth to it. But strictly speaking, on this 
point we must draw a distinction between worldly truth in ShinshQ and 
common, ordinary morality. The general attitude toward common 
morality is that one really has no other way to proceed: somehow each 
individual must maintain a practice of moral [standards]. For, 
regardless of whether or not it is actually possible, we have no choice 
but to commit ourselves to carry out [these ideals] one at a time. Even 
if one’s resolve is firm, however, when it comes to the point of the ac­
tual implementation [of the morally ideal act], one gradually falls into 
a state of anxiety. In the end, the individual will turn to religion or 
become hopelessly despondent about the future of mankind. The 
worldly truth as expounded in ShinshO stands side by side with the ab­
solute truth, [and we must bear in mind that] future events will all be 
realized by absolute truth. From the outset, therefore, the teachings im­
ply no imperative to seek one’s own progress in terms of worldly truth. 
Especially in its praxis, one will encounter troubles as we have mention­
ed above. No matter how hard we strive, there is no means by which we
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can do something laudable. Moreover, [on the personal level], the abil­
ity or inability to [successfully] carry out these ideals depends upon the 
content of one’s karmic fruition or inherent make-up; if one’s karmic 
or natural design is inferior, no matter how much effort he may make, 
he is simply at a stage where he is unable to produce anything superior. 
In any case, [we can say] for Shinshfi, worldly truth does riot aim at the 
usual goal of competency in the implementation [of the teachings] such 
that we perform praiseworthy deeds; its efficacy lies elsewhere. Accord­
ingly there is a great difference in the thrust of the Shinshu worldly 
truth and common morality which itself aims at performing commen­
dable acts. Put an other way, it does not really matter whether one in­
tends to do something splendid or something wretched: the goal of the 
worldly truth teaching in Shinshfl is not concerned with such notions.
One may wonder, then, what the purpose of ShinshQ worldly truth 
actually is. The answer is simply that it aims to lead the individual to 
the [above-stated] perception that one cannot, in fact, perform these 
moral tasks. Although there may be differences between those who 
have attained shinjin as it relates to absolute truth and those who have 
not, it should be noted that the perception of the impossibility of moral 
praxis is identical in both cases.
[By way of explanation,] let us first turn to those who have not yet at­
tained shinjin. Having experienced the difficulty of [common] moral 
practice, such people often become religious and thereby proceed down 
the road to the attainment of shinjin. At first glance, this may not seem 
terribly significant but in fact it is not a simple matter. For the single 
basic impediment blocking the entrance to tariki faith is the conviction 
that one is capable of practicing jiriki discipline. Although there are 
many kinds of jiriki disciplined praxis, the most common and universal 
is behavior considered ethical or moral. As long as one thinks proper 
moral action is indeed possible, the entrance to tariki religion is 
ultimately blocked. It is an indispensable condition for becoming 
religious that one experiences [the disappointment incurred when] 
honestly seeking to mould one’s behavior to conform to ethics or 
morality, one realizes that ultimately things will not turn out as ex­
pected. In the case of those who have not attained shinjin, since the 
primary objective is ultimately the surrender of the deluded jiriki mind, 
this experience may occur in reference to an assortment of different 
moral schemes: the teachings of ShinshQ worldly truth, the teachings
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of contemporary social ethics or [current norms of] morality, the five 
precepts/ the ten wholesome aspects of behavior,5 6 an attempt to do 
good in all actions., etc. But the teachings of Shinshu worldly truth are 
the most favorable because they are part of a system that opens the 
door to absolute truth.
5 S. Pafica-ftla. These are prescribed for all Buddhist laymen: no killing, stealing, il­
licit sex, lying, or drinking of intoxicants.
6 S. Da^a-ktdala. These are the paHca-flla mentioned above plus no immoral 
language, slander, equivocation, covetousness, anger, or false views.
7 Dai-anjin Anjin is a traditional term in Pure Land Buddhism referring to
the attainment whereby one’s anxieties are relieved about Birth in the Pure Land and 
all that this implies. In ShinshQ terminology, it is generally used as a synonym for shin­
jin.
Next we will consider someone after he has obtained shinjin. 
Although we attain “the great pacified mind”7 as a result of our ex­
perience of tariki shinjin, the habitual deluded mind of jiriki continues 
to arise nonetheless. Thereafter, when we hear teachings on worldly 
truth, they seem directed precisely at this deluded mind. Our reaction is 
to immediately attempt to put these ideals into practice. When we then 
engage in such practice, however, we eventually perceive how truly 
difficult this is. It is then we turn around and rejoice [once again] in our 
tariki faith, returning to the attitude embodied in the phrase, “In the 
joy of faith of the truly sincere mind, the self is forgotten; one returns 
to the non-doing and non-becoming ocean of faith.” In other words, 
in the situation [of one who has attained shinjin], because one’s praxis 
is so difficult, the worldly truth teaching exists to deepen one’s 
thoughts of gratitude toward the infinite compassion [of the Buddha].
Of these two approaches to the worldly truth teachings, the first is an 
example of “choosing the appropriate teachings and making use of 
them”. When people hear that in Shinshu there is the idea of a 
worldly/absolute theory of two truths or a mutually dependent two- 
truth theory, they may think this reflects a religion which has not 
forgotten about society and the nation—revealing they are unable [at 
this point] to grasp the shinjin of absolute truth. When such people 
diligently attempt to practice the Shinshu worldly truth in the form of 
ethics or morals, in the end this [experience] becomes a guide which 
brings them to a grasp of the shinjin of absolute truth. Yet the true 
meaning of the traditional theory of mutually dependent two truths is
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expressed in the second example given above [i.e. after one has attained 
shinjin]. It is precisely because one has reached absolute truth shinjin 
that he is not surprised by his inability to actuate [the morality of] 
worldly truth. And because he fails at this his sense of graciousness 
toward his shinjin in the absolute truth deepens. It is here that the in­
dividual truly grasps the implications of this relationship of mutual 
dependence and mutual support.
The essential message of the worldly truth lies, as we have just 
stated, in the case of those who have experienced shinjin, but there is 
one more point to be made regarding the subsequent development of 
this understanding. Although it is true that the issue of praxis in regard 
to worldly truth is first relevant because it is problematic, with the 
passage of time the true nature of worldly truth becomes apparent even 
without sensing the difficulties involved in its application. Finally, one 
reaches the point where, upon hearing words such as “worldly truth” 
or “morality,” he can savor the true implications of the mutually 
dependent two truths. Thus, while it may be impossible for me to imple­
ment this truth, [I know] such an impossibility is a matter of course. At 
the same time [I am perplexed about my practice], this self that is 
stymied is encompassed by an infinite compassion that will never yield. 
Truly the only emotion here is gratitude—a surge of humility and joy. 
This state of mind may not arise readily in the beginning, but in the end 
it appears instantly whenever one hears about “worldly truth” and 
other such notions.8
There is also a contrary proof of this. Someone involved with the 
Shinshu teaching of worldly truth may see the anguish another person 
goes through regarding common moral issues like “Should I abide by 
this or not?” or “Can I do without this or not?” On the one hand while 
pitying the misleading prejudices of that person who is still committed 
to models of moral behavior, on the other he delights in the peaceful ac­
ceptance of his own spiritual situation. Indeed, questions of respon-
• Note Kiyozawa’s use of the passive action of hearing here. Since all praxis directed 
toward personal liberation, not only that of morality or worldly truth, is considered 
futile in ShinshO doctrine. Shinran’s emphasis on hearing the Dharma (J. mon Bl!) has 
long since taken the role of religious praxis in ShinshO. The technical term mon in Shin­
shO specifically refers to encountering the Truth through hearing the preaching of the 
Dharma. Though Kiyozawa’s use of hearing is somewhat different here as it includes or­
dinary social morality, it does lead to the same religious affirmation.
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sibility or obligation as in “should I. . . or “can I . . . ” occupy a 
predominant share of the anxiety in our lives; their influence is simply 
enormous. Though worldly truth as seen in ShinshU may contain 
elements of a command idiom expressed in terms of “Do this. ... Do 
not do that/* generally speaking, in its core it does not approve of such 
exterior pressures as “You should do this” and “You must not do 
that.” Even in cases where some anxiety is created from the use of such 
[enjoining language], it is not comparable to the anguish experienced 
under the deluded thinking of common morality. In other words, when 
arbitrary notions of “You must do this” and “You must not do that” 
are added to the delusory abstractions of common morality wherein 
one is merely ordered to “Do this. ... Do not do that,” the situation 
[may escalate to where] it seems a solemn command has come down 
from God or the Buddha saying, “You absolutely must do this,” or 
“It is strictly forbidden for you to do that.” People accordingly come 
to think that the crucial matter of their salvation will depend on their 
ability or inability to implement so-called proper moral behavior, con­
sequently feeling “If I do not do this, I will not be saved,” or “If I do 
that I will not be saved.” It is a matter of course that an extreme anxie­
ty thus develops in regards to one’s capacity of behave appropriately. 
Whether or not one is able to actuate the worldly truth teaching in Shin- 
shfl, however, has not the slightest relation to the most important fact 
of one’s salvation. Though there may be some anxiety over one’s abil­
ity to implement [Buddhist ethics as called for in scripture], not only is 
this incomparable to the unease arising from the arbitrary abstractions 
of ordinary morality, but the nature of [Buddhist and non-Buddhist] 
concerns in this area is completely different. One contains an anxiety 
over being tormented by a devil, the other effects deep shame toward 
the great compassion of the Buddha. In one there are tears cried in fear 
and the expression of an intense anger at never being forgiven, while in 
the other there are tears which come from being touched by the depth 
of compassion and mercy [in the Buddha] which encompasses us 
anywhere, anytime.9
9 Here Kiyozawa seems to be making a veiled attack on Christianity and its doctrine 
of final judgement. The Buddhist world in Japan (and throughout Asia, for that mat­
ter) underwent unceasing attack from Christian missionaries and their newfound con­
verts at this time. These attacks often focused on moral themes, chiding Japan’s Bud-
Because of this situation the ShinshU worldly truth teaching is not
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something which sets out to impose prescriptions on human behavior. 
If it were offering regulations for our actions, we would expect its prin­
ciples to be definite and precise. In fact, whether it be simple “rules,” a 
general notion of duty to the state, or the five [Confucian] cardinal vir­
tues of benevolence, justice, politeness, wisdom and fidelity, the forms 
[Shinshu statements take regarding such obligations] are decidedly 
vague. Even in the basic formula of the “five good acts and five bad 
acts”10 or the phrase, “only excluding those who have committed the 
five grave offenses and those who have slandered the Dharma . . . ,”n 
the intent is, again, somewhat different. Of course if one were seeking 
to reconcile these with each other, he could say that they all may be im­
plying the same thing. But it is better not to force such an accommoda­
tion. Why? Because just as we have stated above, the worldly truth 
teaching of Shinshu is not aimed at its actualization; if anything, it em­
phasizes arousing the perception that its actualization is in fact impossi­
ble. There is no need to enumerate every instance of this in detail, just 
as there is no need to fix its meaning. It applies to whatever approach 
one takes: it is therefore acceptable to see this as either imploring one 
to practice what is said to be good, or urging one not to do what said to 
be bad. In either case the individual will reach the point where he 
awakens to the fact that the perfect practice of neither is possible. 
Grasping this is nothing less than the elation of shinjin in absolute 
truth. The worldly truth teaching is thus nothing less than the means to 
perceive absolute truth from its back side by means of shinjin. That is 
to say, as opposed to the positivity of absolute truth, worldly truth is 
appealing for its negativity. For that reason it is a great misperception 
to think the worldly truth teaching exists in order to compel people to
dhist legacy for allowing such things as prostitution, sexually mixed communal 
bathing, unbridled alcoholic consumption, etc. For more details, cf. the translator's 
“Kiyozawa Mans hi and the Meaning of Buddhist Ethics,” cited above.
10 This phrasing comes from the standard translation of the so-called Larger 
Sukhavati-vyuha by Samghavarman, the Wu-iiangshou ching (T*360), an ear­
ly work where the Sanskrit term pafica-fila (cf. n. 3 above) is rendered as “good acts” 
3lW, as opposed to its more common translation as Not observing these five 
precepts was then termed the five “bad acts”
" This phrase is added as a sort of disclaimer in the famous eighteenth vow of the 
Wu-liang shou ching wherein these transgressors are excluded from this promise to all 
sentient beings by Amitfibha Buddha to guarantee Birth in his Pure Land by means of 
their sincere reciting of his name.
107
KIYOZAWA
uphold standards of human behavior or by extension to benefit society 
and the nation. If the worldly truth teaching were expounded in connec­
tion with the laws of the king or the precepts of benevolence and 
humanity, as a matter of course it would be conducive to the perfor­
mance of [these duties] to some degree. In fact [such concerns] are an 
appendant phenomenon. Since there is a degree of efficacy in these sec­
ondary aspects, however, their esteem in society has resulted in the 
main point [of the teaching] being overlooked entirely. Despite the fact 
that the essential thrust of the doctrine is religious, it is its appended 
moral elements that seem to be valued most highly; a strange set of cir­
cumstances indeed!
In general, when one speaks in the same breath of Buddhist worldly 
truth and morality or the nation-state (kokka a^), one should take 
care to explicate the qualities of each. Looking first at worldly truth 
and morality, the primary need is to know what is meant by worldly 
truth. Upon trying to explain this, one immediately notices that world­
ly truth stands alongside absolute truth in the doctrine of tariki Shin- 
shfi. In other words, [Buddhist worldly truth] is not a teaching of 
morality but a teaching of religion; it is not a teaching about the way of 
men but about the way of Buddhas. Seeing it in this way, it goes 
without saying that worldly truth is something to be explained by a 
religious person and that its goal must be to produce religious results. 
Morality, on the other hand, is morality—it is not religion. It is a 
teaching about the way of men, not the way of Buddhas. Hence it 
should be expounded by a moralist with the goal of producing moral ac­
complishments. Although politicians do not avoid speaking about 
business matters, politicians are not merchants. Although the world of 
business is not unrelated to [the growing of] grain, merchants are 
farmers. In that religion and morality have been separated, there is no 
need to confuse their domains. If one does not recognize the distinc­
tion between religion and morality, thereby taking the stance that 
religion is none other than morality and morality is none other than 
religion, then any discussion of the relationship between Buddhist 
worldly truth and morality is pointless. Furthermore, in such a context 
one would not be discussing morality in relation to worldly truth 
wherein worldly truth is contradistinguished from absolute truth, for 
this position implies both truths are teachings of morality.
Let us now consider the relationship between worldly truth and soci-
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ety and/or the nation-state. Since in general the notion of worldly 
truth is a religious teaching, it goes without saying that its contribution 
to society and the nation-state is, at the same time, a contribution of 
religious merit. It is one thing to recognize someone’s religious con­
tribution [to society] in his energies toward expounding the absolute 
truth teaching. It is quite another to then turn around and criticize the 
same person because he has not devoted equal effort to propagating the 
worldly truth teachings [conceived to be of more direct social 
significance]. If absolute and worldly truth were distinct, then it would 
be acceptable to say there is an insufficiency if we teach one and not the 
other. But as they reflect only the front and back of the same thing, 
there should be nothing lacking if we teach only one. In any case, there 
should be no argument that the contribution to state and society of 
preaching even worldly truth lies in its religious impact, so when we ex­
pound the absolute truth teaching, this is already in effect.
There is also an argument which states that while it may be accept­
able to draw a distinction between religion and morality such that 
religious people preach religion and moralists preach morality, it 
would be improper [if this distinction means] destroying morality in 
order to expound religion. If such a result were before us it would not 
be a trifling matter. But there is really nothing that can be done about 
it. If morality is that weak, then its dissolution may not be such a bad 
thing. It is, after all, the duty of a religious person to teach religion. 
And he fulfills that duty for purposes of religious efficacy, certainly not 
because he intends to do away with morality. For this reason, if morali­
ty were destroyed, morality would be destroyed by itself. One wonders, 
however, if such vague arguments are really appropriate to this discus­
sion. Just what is the religious person supposed to preach [about 
morality]? He cannot choose between someone who has killed another 
and someone who has not. Frankly, it is irrelevant to the religious 
point of view whether the person before him is a thief or not, or 
whether or not someone who wants to commit adultery should be al­
lowed to do so. [The preacher of religion] has no choice but to stress 
that infinite compassion does not base its salvific intent on discrimina­
tions among individuals who have committed murders, thefts, etc.
How does the moralist respond to this? Is this something which he 
feels will destroy morality, something which will vitiate humanity? 
Anyone who immediately affirms such statements does so rashly. [They
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would be assuming] that he who consciously distinguishes religion 
from morality would be obligated for religious reasons to withhold con­
demnation for murder, theft, licentiousness or falsehood. From a 
humanistic, moral point of view, murder and theft are heinous crimes; 
licentiousness and falsehood must not be permitted. The people who 
commit these offenses are all transgressors against humanity and, in a 
moral sense, depraved individuals. [It is thus without denigrating 
morality that we advocate) the religious expounding the Dharma from 
a religious standpoint and moralists preaching from their own moral 
concern. Standing separately, there is no hint of a conflict of interest. 
Consider the mind of someone who has committed one of the offenses 
mentioned above. If he were concerned with morality before feeling 
disturbed about religion, he would repent and- thereafter devote 
himself to a moral path. If he gives precedence to religion, he would 
rush at once to a portal of religion. If he needs religion and morality 
combined, then, repenting his sin, he will commit himself to the paths 
of both. If he is someone who does not reflect upon either religion or 
morality, he will probably wander in the dark night of his crime just as 
he is. From this perspective one can also understand those moments 
when [they] have refrained from such transgressions.
In conclusion, we must recognize that vague arguments about 
religion being harmful to morality, or the establishment of Buddhism 
meaning the destruction of humanistic values, only invite misunder­
standing. Issues such as these demand precision. The distinction be­
tween religion and morality should now be clear: [we expect] religious 
individuals to uphold the religious dimension of life and moralists to 
maintain [standards of] morality. If each works to his full capacity, 
then each will contribute his own meritorious services to the society 
and the nation.
Above I have expressed my understanding just as it is on the issue of 
the relationship between the worldly truth of ShinshQ and the so-called 
ethics and morality of society by letting my brush run freely. This being 
a work written after I have become ill, I would like to express my 
apologies for it being at a stage where a certain carelessness has been 
unavoidable.
(From the May, 1903 issue of Seishinkai)
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